receive 20 monetary units and decide how much to contribute to the public pool and how much to keep for themselves. The contributions are multiplied by 1.6 and split evenly among the four group members.
In order to reveal how individual respond to institutional punishment/reward in PGG, three different incentive schemes are conducted, which are called Const, Up and Down, respectively (60 Const groups, 57 Up groups and 62 Down groups, see Table S1 ), where the amount of punishment/reward is a fixed constant in Const, and an increasing (decreasing) function of the group's total contribution in Up (Down) (see SI, subsection 1.2). For each of Const, Up and Down, there are three treatments. In these three treatments, each round of PGG is followed by a second stage, which corresponds respectively to an institutional punishment (IP), an institutional reward (IR), or both institutional reward and punishment (IRP) (see SI, subsection 1.2). After each round of the IP treatment (IP, 20 groups in Const, 19 groups in Up and 21 groups in Down), one subject is selected to be punished with a probability that decreases as the contribution the subject makes to the common pool increases. In the IR treatment (IR, 20 groups in Const, 18 groups in Up and 21 groups in Down), one subject is selected to be rewarded with the symmetric probability (relative to the endowment) that increases in the subject's contribution. In the IRP treatment (IRP, 20 groups in Const, 20 groups in Up and 20 groups in Down), one of the four subjects is selected to be punished with the IP probabilities and one subject is independently selected to be rewarded with the IR probabilities. Table S1 shows the numbers of subjects and groups in the control experiment, and the numbers of subjects and groups in the three treatments for each of the three incentive schemes. Table S1 : Numbers of subjects and groups in the control experiment and in the three treatments for each of the three incentive schemes Control   Const  Up  Down  Total  IR  IP  IRP  IR  IP  IRP  IR  IP  IRP   No. of  groups  19  20  20  20  18  19  20  21  21  20  198   No. of  subjects  76  80  80  80  72  76  80  84  84  80  792 Calculating your scores:
Step 2. 20-(your contribution to the public pool) +1.6× (sum of all contributions)/4
Two examples:
(1) Each player contributes 20 units to the public pool. Then each player receives 32 units, i.e., 20-20 +1.6×(20+20+20+20)÷4=32.
(2) a 1 =20, a 2 =20, a 3 =20 and a 4 =0 (where a i represents the contribution of player i, i=1,2,3,4); players 1, 2 and 3 receive 24 units (i.e., 20-20 +1.6×(20+20+20+0)÷4=24); and player 4 receives 44 units (i.e., 20-0 +1.6×(20+20+20+0)÷4=44).
Instructions of Sessions 2, 5 and 8 (treatment IR in Const, Up and Down)
Instructions:
Thank you for participating in this experiment.
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to ask us. Aside from this, no communication or phone call is allowed during the experiment.
This experiment is about decision making. Everyone will receive a fixed amount of 25-yuan RMB for participating in the experiment. In addition, based on the scores you get during the experiment, you will receive an average amount of 25-yuan RMB. The exchange rate is 50 units=1 Yuan.
Everything will be paid to you in cash immediately after the experiment.
You have been randomly matched with 3 other people in the room, and you always interact with the same three people. None of you will ever know the identity of the others. Each member of your group will be assigned a number (1-4) that represents his/her identity. In addition, you have an extra label of "me". Your score is based on the choices made by you and the three other members of your group. Everyone's initial endowment is 0.
Interactions:
The interaction has an unknown number of rounds.
Step 1. In each round, each person in your group is endowed with 20 units. You have to decide how many of the 20 units you are going to put in the public pool and how many of them to keep for yourself. You must enter your decision within 25 seconds; otherwise there will be a notice on the screen.
Step 2. The total sum of all 4 players' contributions is multiplied by 1.6 and then evenly split among all 4 players. Each player gets the same share from the public pool.
Step 3. After
Step 2, the system will give one of the 4 players some extra units.
Step 4. You can see the contributions and scores of all 4 players. Your score for this round is the sum of the units that you keep for yourself, the earnings from the public pool and the possible extra units.
Step 5. We will move to the next round.
Calculating your scores:
Step 2.
( ) ( )
1.6 sum of all contributions 20 your contribution to the public pool 4
Step 3. Your chance to get extra units will rise proportionately to your contribution to the public pool. This chance (probability) is calculated as respectively. The number of extra units is 20 in Const, 16+0.12×(group's total contribution) in Up, and 16+0.12×(80 -group's total contribution) in Down, respectively.
(Note: Participants were only told the formula for the extra units appropriate for their session. For example, participants in Const were told that there were 20 extra units).
An example:
a 1 =20, a 2 =20, a 3 =20 and a 4 =0.
Players 1, 2 and 3 each receive 24 units (i.e., 20-20 +1.6×(20+20+20+0)÷4=24) at the end of
Step 2. (Note: Participants were only given the example appropriate for their session.)
Instructions of Sessions 3, 6 and 9 (treatment IP in Const, Up and Down)
Interactions:
Step 1. In each round, each person in your group is endowed with 20 units. And you have to decide how many of the 20 units you are going to put in the public pool and how many of them to keep for yourself. You must enter your decision within 25 seconds; otherwise there will be a notice 7 on the screen.
Step 3. After step 2, the system will deduct some units from one of the 4 players.
Step 4. You can see the contributions and scores of all 4 players. Your score for this round is the sum of the units that you keep for yourself and the earnings from the public pool, minus the possible deducted units.
Step 3. Your chance to have units deducted will rise proportionately to the units that you keep for yourself. This chance (probability) is calculated as This experiment is about decision making. Everyone will receive a fixed amount of 25-yuan RMB for participating in the experiment. In addition, based on the scores you get during the experiment, you will receive an average amount of 25-yuan RMB. The exchange rate is 50 units=1 Yuan.
Step 1. In each round, each person in your group is endowed with 20 units. And you have to decide how many of the 20 units you are going to put in the public pool and how many of them to keep for yourself. You must enter your decision within 25 seconds; otherwise there will be a notice on the screen.
Step 3. After step 2, the system will give one of the 4 players some extra units, and deduct some units from one of the 4 players.
Step 4. You can see the contributions and scores of all 4 players. Your score for this round is the sum of the units you keep for yourself, the earnings from the public pool, and the possible extra units, minus the possible deducted units.
Step 2:
1.6 sum of all contributions 20 your contribution to the public pool 4 × − +
Step 3:
(1) Your chance to have extra units will rise proportionately to your contribution to the public pool. This chance (probability) is calculated as Table S2 confirms that there is no significant change in cooperation from the first to the last round in all three treatments IR, IP and IRP. For both Up and Down (Figure 1b-c), Table S2 shows there is a significant increase in cooperation from the first to the last round in IRP whereas there is either a decrease or no change in IP and IR. to each of the three incentive schemes (see Table S3 ), cooperation in IRP is significantly higher than IP, IR and C; IP is significantly higher than C, and there is no significant difference between IR and C. Furthermore, IP is significantly higher than IR in Up and Down but there is no significant difference in Const. This contrasts with previous experimental results from the repeated PGG using peer incentives where either all three corresponding treatments were equally effective in increasing the level of cooperative behavior 6 or the punishment treatment was not significantly better than reward 4 . Table S4 shows that the only significant difference between the three incentive schemes in any of the three treatments is that contribution levels are significantly higher in Up compared to Const or Down for the IRP treatment. 
Relative contribution and expected relative payoff in our repeated PGG game with institutional incentives
Some basic definitions for our experiments are given in this subsection. Let 
Expected relative payoff and NE in a single round
In this subsection, we present a general framework for analyzing the NE in a single-round PGG Although there are more direct methods to show that the only NE in the control experiment is for everyone to free-ride, let us use relative contribution and expected relative payoff to prove this.
As we will see, this method generalizes to find NE in the three incentive schemes as well.
In C, ( ) 
The term ( ) In summary, for any reward amount A , there is a unique NE. When the reward is low, the NE is to free-ride. Above some threshold reward level, the NE contribution increases as the reward increases, eventually reaching contribution level E after which the NE stays at this level (see Figure S1a ). This qualitative behavior is the same as that found for other institutional reward incentive schemes 15-16,20,41 .
In . NE behavior in a single round of our IR treatment suggests that individuals should contribute more than the free-riding NE of the control C.
2) In IP, the punishment probability of an individual who contributes c in a group that otherwise contributes c is taken as the probability that an individual who contributes E c − in a group that otherwise contributes E c − receives the reward in IR. From symmetry, this probability is
E c n E c n c
, which is a decreasing function of c . Thus, the expected relative payoff of this individual is 
The term ( ) In summary, for any punishment, the only possible NE occur when all group members either free-ride or all contribute E . Furthermore, for low (respectively, high) levels of punishment, the unique NE is to free-ride (respectively, contribute E ). For intermediate levels, both are NE (see Figure S1b ). These outcomes are qualitatively the same as that found for other institutional punishment incentive schemes 
where the term ( ) ( 1) ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) 
The term ( )
c n c
represents the effect of punishment on expected relative payoff in IP. For 0 c E < < to correspond to a NE, c must now satisfy
( 1)
n n E c n c ( 1) 
If c corresponds to a NE, then One other connection between the experimental results and rational behavior deserves discussion. Suppose an individual is in a group whose other three members always fully contribute.
Then his expected relative payoff of free-riding ordered from highest to lowest in the experiments is Control, IR, IP, IRP (see Figure S2 ). That is, his payoff incentive to free-ride has this order. 
Individual behavior heterogeneity: conforming, cooperating and defecting
According to the definitions in Table 2 in the main text, the patterns that individuals display conforming, cooperating and defecting behaviors between rounds, respectively, from round 1 to round 49 are examined for each of the treatments. These are shown in Figure S4 . The average proportions of individuals who display conforming, cooperating and defecting, respectively, over all 49 rounds for each treatment are given in Table S5 . Table S5 : Average proportions of individuals who display conforming, cooperating and defecting behaviors between rounds over all 49 rounds for each of the treatments (see Figure 2a in the main text and Figure S4 ). After this was done 1000 times, the average proportions of conforming, cooperating and defecting in the simulations were 0.3838 0.0067 ± , 0.3260 0.0065 ± and 0.2901 0.0059 ± , respectively. Since the average percentage of conforming in this "shuffle" method is significantly less than in Control (38% vs 54%), participants in our experiments were not randomly choosing their contributions without regard to payoffs or the contributions of other group members.
Conforming

Behavioral transition from one round to the next round
In fact, movements among behavioral types can be used to predict our experimental outcomes.
From the experimental data in Control, IR, IP and IRP, the transition probabilities (from one round to the next round) between the three behavioral types (conforming, cooperating, and defecting) are given in Table S6 . For IR, IP and IRP, these probabilities are calculated from the combined data for all three incentive schemes, Const, Up and Down. For the limiting distribution of the Markov chain, we assume that an individual who is cooperating (respectively, defecting) will contribute 20 (respectively, 0), and that an individual who is conforming will contribute the group average contribution of the previous round. The distribution of contributions in the experiment compared to the limiting distribution from the resultant Markov chains with these transition matrices is shown in Figure S5 . Indeed, qualitative agreement between these distributions is shown there for all experimental protocols.
For example, in each of Control, IP, IR and IRP, the difference between the experimental distribution and the limiting distribution of its Markov chain is not significant ( Figure S5 ) whereas there is a significant difference between the experimental distribution and many of the limiting distributions of the Markov chain of a different experiment. Interestingly, there are also some differences that seem to be influenced by extrinsic factors outside our theoretical model. For instance, actual frequencies of contributions at multiples of 5 are above those predicted (perhaps due to typical monetary systems) and contributions of 8 (respectively, 4) are marginally higher (respectively, lower) than predicted from the Markov chain (perhaps due to these being considered as "lucky" (respectively, "unlucky") numbers in China). 
Individuals' reactions to being rewarded and being punished
The Table S8 : For three contribution ranges, i.e. 1-10, 11-19, and 1-19, the results of the Mann-Whitney U test (i.e. P-values) for the differences between Figure 2c and Figure 2d , between Figure 2c and Figure S6a , and between Figure 2d and Figure S6b are given in Tables S8a-c, respectively. The symbol "*" denotes that the difference is significant, i.e. P-value < 0.05. 
